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I. METHODOLOGY, SCOPE AND PHILOSOPHICAL CRITERIA  
 
Designing a summary approach to the current scenario of Natural Law theory in 
Spain and Portugal is not an easy task. Traditionally, theologians, philosophers, sociologists 
and lawyers have displayed a committed interest in this area over the centuries and hence 
produced abundant literature that renders any synthesis attempt quite a complex enterprise. 
On the other hand, there is an undeniable plurality of perspectives dealing with Natural 
Law, which makes it appropriate to adopt the open and flexible rationale mentioned by 
Entico Pattaro in his presentation to his Legal Philosophical Library (Pattaro 1982, p. 17). 
 
Considering the wide and heterogeneous character of Natural Law theories in Spain 
and Portugal, to establish sharp and aprioristic distinctions may be useful just for partial 
research projects, but it stands as an inadequate choice for the general scope adopted in this 
paper. The aim and extension of this essay also recommend a fundamentally descriptive 
approach, which does not entail a total discard of personal positioning when this when this 
would appear to be unavoidable. Besides, these boundaries imply that scholars, issues and 
theories are addressed in a necessary non-exhaustive fashion.  
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Comments need also to be made regarding some fundamental methodological 
groundings. Bearing in mind that it is our current philosophical and legal panorama which 
this paper attempts to describe, it seems advisable to consider theories as something alive, 
in-the-making, so to say, thus excluding the acceptance of a slant drawn upon rigid, well-
established and unalterable doctrinal conceptions. The scholar who attempts a historical 
study of their present time undertakes some form of ursprüngliche Geschichte, in its 
Hegelian meaning. He counts on a close look based upon his direct experience as both actor 
and chronicler of the described reality, but, at the same time, he lacks the sort of certainty 
that only distance may grant.  
 
One final warning. There are some shared historical and cultural features that enable 
the joint treatment of both the Spanish and Portuguese Natural Law theories. Yet, it would 
certainly be a mistake to assume an undifferenced approach to these two traditions, which 
count on their own history and peculiarities. Consequently, a common treatment is provided 
for the forging era of these traditions, in which the interchange of ideas and approaches was 
more intense; while a separate presentation is considered more appropriate for 20th century 
theories, where differences are more acute.  
 
II. NATURAL LAW IN THE SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE TRADITIONS 
 
The Spanish institutionalized study of Natural Law may be considered to coincide 
with the founding in 1228 of the oldest Spanish University – the University of Salamanca. 
Ius commune, Civil Law and Canonical Law were studied at this institution prompted by 
deep theological, philosophical and political concerns. At the same time, many issues that 
are currently included within the scope of Legal Philosophy were treated in Philosophia 
practica classes, where an Aristotelian model inspired the approach to moral, legal and 
political problems. In contrast, little interest was shown for positive law during a long 
period. This piece of information did not passed unnoticed for Chaim Perelam, who 
remarked, in his study on “La réforme de l'enseignement du droit et la nouvelle 
rhétorique”, that the famous University of Salamanca library dedicates little space for 
classical works on Spanish Law, while literature devoted to Theology, Moral Philosophy 
and Natural Law is widely abundant (Perelman 1975, p. 5). 
 
From the beginning of the 15th century, and especially during the 16th and 17th 
centuries, scholars pertaining to the so-called “Escuela de Salamanca” (Salamanca School), 
also known in a broader manner as “Clásicos españoles del derecho natural” (Spanish 
Natural Law Classics), produced copious literature gathered under the titles De Justitia et 
iure and De legibus, which can inform an understanding of the configuration of modern 
Natural Law. Even more, the very expression “Natural Law” appears to have been first 
used by a Spanish scholar, Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca (1512-1569) in his De vero 
iure naturali (circa 1560), and not by Hugo Grotius, as it is sometimes assumed. This era, 
doubtlessly one of the most brilliant epochs for the Spanish legal-philosophical thinking, 
did not only see the forging of modern Natural Law, but also the birth of Criminal Law 
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theory thanks to the contributions of Alfonso de Castro (1495-1558) as well as the new 
conceptions of the Law of the Peoples due to the decisive works of Francisco de Vitoria 
(1492-1546) and the aforementioned Vázquez de Menchaca. A crucial factor for the vigour 
of Natural Law thinking in this era was its antidogmatism. Spanish scholars did not limit 
themselves to a servile reception of scholastic sources. On the contrary, they subjected 
those sources to a critical revision according to the exigencies of that time. They also 
showed an independent attitude, sometimes daring to overtly criticize the established 
power. It was this attitude that led Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolomé de las Casas (1474-
1566) to defend a position contrary to the political interests of the Crown, designing the 
exigencies for an admissible legal status for the recently conquered peoples of the New 
World. In this cultural atmosphere, Domingo de Soto (1494-1560) and Francisco Suárez 
(1548-1617) proposed valuable theses in order to identify the democratic grounding of the 
government, while Jesuit father Juan de Mariana (1536-1624) established a definite 
characterization of the right of resistance. It comes as no surprise that the Spanish Legal-
philosophical thought served in this age as a model for the renovation of Natural Law 
undertaken by Grotius and for the theoretical justification of popular sovereignty launched 
by Althusius (Pérez Luño 1994; Trujillo 1997; Truyol y Serra 1975). 
 
The University of Coimbra in Portugal, playing an analogous role as a spreading 
focus of philosophical and legal thought within the country, assumed a similar position to 
that of the University of Salamanca in Spain. In the Renaissance era, cultural relations 
between these two countries were intense and the theses of the Spanish classics of Natural 
Law found in Portugal a receptive soil for its diffusion and development.   
 
Manuel Paulo Merêa, the most important figure in Portuguese 20th century legal 
historiography, dedicated an interesting book to the study of Spanish Jesuit Francisco 
Suárez, paying special attention to his time as a professor in Coimbra (Merêa 1917). 
Another Spanish Jesuit, Luis de Molina (1535-1600) lectured in both Coimbra and Evora 
Universities, contributing to the forming of a relevant school of scholars devoted to Natural 
Law in the latter one (Díez-Alegría 1951). Balancing this flow, some Portuguese 
intellectuals developed their work in Spain. The most remarkable was Lisboan Serafim de 
Freitas (1570-1633), who lectured in Valladolid and opposed the theses on freedom of 
navigation of Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca, while sharing University location in the 
Castilian city. Menchaca’s ideas were furthered by Grotius in his work De mare liberum. 
Freitas contested both scholars with his "mare clausum" theory, in which he rejects the idea 
that the seas may be considered as “common things” (res communes) that may not be object 
of occupation, appropriation or limitation of use. The life of Portuguese Antonio Vieira 
(1608-1697) may be considered to run parallel to that of the Spanish Dominican Bartolomé 
de las Casas. Born in Lisbon, he spent most of his life in Brazil, where he contributed to the 
defence of the dignity and liberty of Amerindians in the name of the ethical, legal and 
political exigencies he managed to derive from his humanist conception of Natural Law.  
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The 18th century saw the inception of an era of decadence in the study of Natural 
Law, as a reflection of the profound economic, social and political crisis that was striking 
Spain at that time. By the middle of the 18th century, the academic vices that pervaded the 
University of Salamanca were not limited to the lecturing and research realms. The very 
structure of the University showed signs of corruption, made evident through the selling of 
professorships and degrees. There is certainly quite an abyss between the University of 
Salamanca that served as a spreading pole for the Spanish classical Natural Law doctrines 
during the Renaissance and Baroque era and the deteriorated version found at the beginning 
of the 18th century. The crisis did not hit the Portuguese Universities that hard thanks to 
policies inspired by the European Enlightenment adopted by Marqués de Pombal. By the 
end of the century, Spain also initiated an Enlightenment movement during the rule of King 
Carlos III. In this time, Portugal and Spain experienced the penetration of rationalist 
versions of Natural Law, which encountered special diffusion in the so-called "Escuela 
Iluminista Salmantina" (Salamanca Illuminist School). The penetration of the spirit of 
Enlightenment brought fresh air to the Salamanca academic atmosphere, saturated by the 
practice of corruption and indulgence in fruitless routines. This intellectual renovation was 
facilitated, in the case of Legal Studies, by the emergence of a committed interest in the 
study of Ius Naturae et gentium, which started to be taught in Reales Estudios de Madrid 
and later in the universities of Valencia, Granada and Zaragoza. No special chair or 
professorship was created in Salamanca for this discipline, but it was cultivated as a part of 
other subjects. The first professor to hold a chair for this specific area in Madrid was 
Joaquín Marín y Mendoza (1721-1782), author of the work Historia del derecho natural y 
de gentes (History of Natural Law and Law of the Peoples), which played a pioneering role 
in the penetration of Enlightenment Natural Law theories. 
 
During the 19th century, the institutionalization of Natural Law as an academic 
discipline became one of the main topics within the ideological controversy sustained by 
liberals and traditionalists in university. At the beginning of that century, liberal ideology 
promoted the establishment of Chairs of Natural Law in the Law Faculties, with syllabuses 
inspired by rationalism and contractualism, thus opposing the conservative and 
traditionalist tendency to defend a merely scholastic study of Natural Law in the 
Philosophy faculties. The influence and diffusion of German Idealism contributed to 
renovate Natural Law theories. Some local peculiarity needs to be acknowledged here, 
since the most studied idealist scholar was Krause, thus leaving aside the great masters of 
this trend: Kant, Hegel, Fichte… In contrast, the spread of Legal Historicism and 
Philosophical Positivism led to a gradual decline of Natural Law theories which aggravated 
by the end of the 19h century (Pérez Luño 2007; Truyol y Serra 2004). 
 
III. 20TH CENTURY REPRESENTATIVE SCHOLARS AND TENDENCIES  
 
The 20th century saw the initiation and development of the main trends and 
philosophical movements that still currently prevail. A thorough analysis of the works and 
doctrines of the last century falls quite beyond the reasonable boundaries of this essay. 
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Instead, a sensible summarizing approach will attempt to provide a description of the 
cultural horizon covering the reflections on Natural Law developed in Spain during the last 
century. With such an aim, the different theoretical positions and research topics will be 
grouped in three representative trends: legal naturalism based upon axiological groundings 
and Neokantian adscription; Neo-Scholastic Natural Law doctrines; and, finally, those 
versions characterised by their innovative, vitalist and experiential approach to Natural 
Law. Through the 20h century several doctrines developed within Legal Theory and 
Philosophy that build up the different versions of Natural Law. The majoritarian adscription 
of philosophers to Natural Law does not entail some sort of uniformity regarding the 
fashion by which the very concept of Natural Law is understood and defined. In fact, a 
direct assumption of a high degree of conceptual heterogeneity is found among Spanish 20th 
-century Natural Lawyers. The frequently denounced “multivocality and equivocalness” of 
Natural Law found a firm confirmation through this variety of Natural Law theories, no 
matter how much diffusion and preponderance one single version may have achieved. 
Hence, the need to establish some theoretical distinctions when approaching this general 
philosophical trend.  
 
III.1. Axiological and Neo-Kantian approaches  
 
When addressing the situation of Natural Law in Spain before the 1936 Civil War, 
reference needs to be made to a group of scholars whose activity focused on the study and 
diffusion in Spanish soil of some of the most influential legal-philosophical movements 
developed in the first half of the past century. These scholars tried to place the basis for 
their Natural Law conceptions away from 19th-century Neo-Scholastic and Krausist 
doctrines that then prevailed within foreign Legal Philosophy. This new grounding for 
Natural Law undertook, in most cases, axiological and Neo-Kantian approaches.  
 
One of the most relevant representatives of the Neo-Kantian trend was Adolfo 
Bonilla San Martín (1875-1926), according to whom every legal rule has both content and 
form. The content is something established by experience, while the form is an a priori 
element. The so-called Natural Law cannot be but a study of the a priori forms of legal 
experience, a sort of legal Logics, a specific normative formal structure with no concrete 
subject or content of any kind (Bonilla San Martín 1897).  
 
A higher degree of fidelity to Neo-Kantianism may be found in the works of 
Francisco Rivera Pastor and Wenceslao Roces, who, though influenced especially by 
Stammler, showed a relevant methodological freedom in their attempts to draw from some 
other philosophical proposals in order to mitigate Stammler’s exacerbated formalism. 
Wenceslao Roces (1897-1992) played a decisive role in the diffusion of Neo-Kantian Legal 
Philosophy in Spain through his exemplary translations of the main works of Radbruch and, 
particularly, Stammler. Francisco Rivera Pastor (1878-1936) wrote some relevant studies 
on the legal projection of Kantian thought which include his essays Algunas notas sobre la 
idea kantiana del derecho natural (Some notes on the Kantian idea of Natural Law) and La 
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razón pura en sí misma y como fundamento del derecho (Pure Reason by itself and as a 
Grounding for Law). His most ambitious attempt to project Kantian or, to be more accurate, 
Neo-Kantian ideas on the Legal realm was his monograph Lógica de la libertad (The 
Logics of Freedom). The main aim of this work lies precisely in thinking and re-elaborating 
the basic concepts and categories within Legal Theory from a Neo-Kantian Natural Law 
perspective. The influence of Radbruch and Stammler may be noticed in Rivera Pastor’s 
purpose aiming at overcoming Kantian formalism (Rivera Pastor 1913).  
 
III.2. Neo-Scholastic Natural Law doctrines  
 
Most of the Neo-Scholastic Natural Law doctrines were developed after the end of 
the Civil War, a period in which they attained an almost absolute preponderance among the 
Legal Philosophers of that time. These theories tried to refer to and/or draw upon classic 
sources, particularly those pertaining to the Spanish School. There were, nonetheless, 
attempts of assimilation of the main contemporary Catholic Natural Law tendencies, most 
of them aimed at rendering them compatible with the traditional thought with a higher or 
lower degree of flexibility.  
 
One of the most significant focuses of Natural Law think was created in the first 
decades of the 20th century in the University of Zaragoza, around the figure of professor 
Luis Mendizábal Martín. Among his disciples we find his own son Alfredo Mendizábal 
Villalba, as well as Miguel Sancho Izquierdo, Enrique Luño Peña, and, at the beginning of 
his academic career, Luis Legaz Lacambra.  
 
This group of scholars, which I proposed to call the “Aragonese School of Natural 
Law” back in the 70s, though much bounded to Neo-Thomism, were also influenced by the 
Neo-Kantian Legal Philosophy of Stammler, Radbruch and fundamentally by Giorgio Del 
Vecchio.  
  
Luis Mendizábal Martín (1859-1931) stands as a linking piece between the 19th 
century treatises and the Natural Law cultivated at the beginning of the 20th century. The 
works of Professor Mendizábal Martín, initiated in 1980 with his Elementos de derecho 
natural (Elements of Natural Law) and continued through the seven editions of his Tratado 
de derecho natural (Treatise of Natural Law) –the last of which was re-elaborated by his 
son Alfredo Mendizábal Villalba (1897-1981)– represent at the same time the hindmost 
example of 19th century Natural Law ways and concerns and the opening to the new 
horizons and problems of the discipline at the beginning of the following century. 
Mendizábal Martín defines Natural Law as a Law enacted by properly driven reason, based 
upon facts and founded on the Divine Law. His conception of Natural Law does not fall 
into inflexibilities, neither it is incapable of taking into account historical circumstances; 
rather, following a common doctrine of Hispanic Natural Law, Mendizábal conceives 
Natural Law as a reality in tension with the requirements of daily life.  
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Mendizábal Martín’s disciples, Miguel Sancho Izquierdo (1890-1988) and Enrique 
Luño Peña (1900-1985), followed the philosophical guidelines established by their Master 
in the structure of their treatises on Natural Law. They both start from the idea of order, to 
establish the relationships between the moral order and the legal order. The latter is 
determined by an aim that works as its regulating principle, which is the notion of common 
good in its most rigorous Thomist sense. Following the doctrine of the Salamanca School, 
Luño Peña sustains the need to concrete the primary principles of Natural Law, that is, to 
project the consequences deduced from Natural Law on to the sphere of practical and 
historical situations. This deductive method is implemented through necessary conclusion 
and approximate determination. When addressing the relationship between Morals and 
Law, he synthesised the Salamanca School theses by proposing a union without unity and a 
distinction without separation between these two normative realms of the human conduct 
(Luño 1968; Mendizábal Martín 1925; Mendizábal Villalba 1928; Sancho Izquierdo 1955). 
    
In the first half of the 20th century, a mention needs to be made to the works of 
University of Madrid-based Professor Pérez Bueno, who as a PhD scholar in the Spanish 
College at Bologna, defended his dissertation titled Breve esposizione delle dottrine etico-
giuridiche di Antonio Rosmini (A Brief Exposition of Antonio Rosmini´s Ethical-Legal 
Doctrines) in 1902. He was the main diffuser of Rosminian thought in Spain, as it may be 
noted in in his book: Doctrinas ético-jurídicas de Antonio Rosmini (Rosmini’s Ethical-
Legal Doctrines). He professed a Thomism-inspired Natural Law, but he was also open to 
other tendencies, as his interest in Sociology and the grounding of Human Rights shows. 
The end of the Civil War surely meant the beginning of a new stage for the evolution of 
Natural Law in Spain. The variety of theoretical directions prior to the 1936-1939 Civil 
War, reflecting an ideological pluralism, was substituted by the overwhelming supremacy 
of “Catholic Natural Law”, which reigned during Franco’s authoritarian regime. The 
literature dedicated to Natural Law in Post-War Spain is strongly uniform. Neo-
Scholasticism, which had already counted on the highest number of followers in the 
previous period, becomes followed practically by every Legal Philosopher, as well as by 
most theoreticians specialising in Public and Private Law from 1939. Even scholars with no 
Thomist background, such as Luis Legaz, Enrique Gómez Arboleya and Salvador de 
Lissarrague produced studies in which they showed an interest in Natural Law and, 
especially, in the Salamanca School. It would clearly be an overstatement to sustain that the 
political regime established in Spain by Franco after the Civil War pretended to support a 
“revival” of the Spanish Natural Law Classics. It is obvious that the so-called Movimiento 
Nacional (National Movement) had to address more urgent issues, culture not being among 
their primary concerns. Nevertheless, peculiar circumstances explain a favourable context 
for an invocation and manipulation of the Salamanca School as it had never been known 
before. Several reasons may be adduced in order to explain this situation. The most evident 
one was the international isolation to which Franco’s regime was subjected after the defeat 
of both Nazi and Fascist totalitarian regimes. Lacking an external political legitimacy 
before their coetaneous democracies, the dictatorship had no choice but to look for an 
internal legitimation rooted in the past. This phenomenon conducted to an exacerbated 
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ideological nationalism, spurred by a distrust and hostility towards anything that could 
hinder the cultural policies of monolithical unity imposed by the regime. The Salamanca 
School was therefore chosen as an autochthonous thinking model with which the glories of 
the lost Empire could be restored. 
 
Among the most representative Natural Lawyers of the Franco era we find Professor 
Francisco Elías de Tejada (1917-1978). He proposed a Catholic Existentialism based upon 
the idea that God assumes a decisive role and that this belief renders it possible to find 
acceptable reasons for an objective-values-based human agency. Elías de Tejada’s disciple, 
Francisco Puy, coordinated and authored El Derecho Natural Hispánico (Hispanic Natural 
Law), whose title may be equivocal, since not all the scholars there referred were Spanish 
and neither could they be considered followers of the Salamanca School strictu sensu. It is, 
albeit, true that some of the most relevant contemporary Spanish Neo-Scholastic Natural 
Law trends were there contained. Puy summarizes the aim of Legal Philosophy, conceived 
in strict Neo- Scholastic terms, in the double function of guiding Law and Politics 
according to a transcendental and therefore transcending (God, the absolute goodness) goal, 
i.e. Natural Law, an idea that may synthesize the whole conception of this School (Puy). 
Eustaquio Galán (1910-1999) also advocated for a strictly Neo-Scholastic Natural Law. 
Natural Law would imply, as Galán defends in his Ius naturae, the belief in a iustum given 
by God or Nature, and hence, pre-positive and more valuable than positive Law; the latter 
having therefore to conform to the former, which functions as a paradigm or canon (Galán).  
 
Another relevant figure in contemporary Spanish Neo-Scholastic Natural Law is 
José Corts Grau (1905-1995) who held the position of vice-chancellor in the University of 
Valencia for a long period. His thought stands as a radical denial of one the nuclear dogmas 
of Legal Positivism: the separation between Law and Morals. He defended in his Curso de 
derecho natural (Natural Law Course) that the legal and moral orders may not be either 
metaphysically or psychologically separated. Such a divorce would mean a failure to 
acknowledge the universal order, or a breakdown in both the divine unity and the human 
unity, a denial of our own nature. Moral subjects and legal subjects are the same and their 
ends, far from excluding each other, they complement and help each other. That is why 
many scholars consider morality as an end and Law as a mean to fulfil its realization. 
Defending a divorce between the moral and the legal orders entails –according to Corts– an 
attack on legal dignity, since Law is rooted in a moral act and not only originates from 
morality but also returns irremediably to its bosom. José Corts Grau undertook the 
intellectual challenge of introducing new contemporary trends in the heart of Neo-
Scholastic Natural Law. With such an aim, he devoted to the study of the contributions 
made by legal institutionalism or existentialism, paying especial attention to Martin 
Heidegger (Corts 1970). 
 
Natural Law pertaining to the classical tradition, either in its Neo-Scholastic 
version or in some other conceptions linked to Christian philosophy, still holds importance 
for a considerable group of lecturers and scholars in contemporary Spain. The direct 
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references to Neo-Scholastic Natural Law made in some John XXIII Encyclicals, 
particularly Mater et Magistra and Pacem in Terris, as well as the social and political 
implications of some Vatican II Constitutions, which bear an unquestionable humanist and 
democratic character, prepared the path for the rehabilitation of Christian Natural Law 
making it compatible and conversant with contemporary culture. Later pontifical and 
pastoral activities have obtained an ambivalent signification: some actions and documents 
have followed the aforementioned humanist trend, while some other contexts have seen 
openly involutive positions that reveal an unfortunate misunderstanding of modern values. 
These two tendencies have influenced the most recent Spanish Catholic Natural Law, 
directed towards positions of aggiornamento, so to say, of Natural Law in some occasions, 
while also adopting clearly pre-conciliar approaches in other instances. A wide group of 
Legal Philosophy lecturers from different Spanish universities have resorted to traditional 
Catholic Natural Law in order to claim for the necessary moral grounding of positive Law, 
advocating a moral objectivism before ethical relativism and making use of these theses to 
address diverse contemporary moral and political concerns. Issues related to marriage, 
divorce, abortion, euthanasia, reverse gender discrimination, secularization and laicism 
have been treated in a dense literature by scholars like Jesús Ballesteros, Francisco 
Carpintero, Francisco Contreras Peláez, Francisco José Lorca Navarrete, Alberto Montoro 
Ballesteros, Andrés Ollero and Ernesto Vidal, among others.  
 
III.3 Innovative Natural Law trends   
 
In the last decades of the last century some theoretical attitudes representing 
innovative points of view come into scene. They sometimes even represent a critical 
position before the so far dominating Neo-Scholastic Natural Law. It is true that the main 
exponents of what I have called “Aragonese School of Natural Law”, as well as some other 
Neo-Scholastic Natural Lawyers like José Corts Grau, showed an open and receptive 
attitude towards some 20th century philosophical, legal and sociological trends, such as 
existentialism, institutionalism, or solidarism, but for the following scholars the innovative 
and/or critical will was central to their understanding of Natural Law. It is, albeit, important 
to notice that these innovative and critical formulations were not proposed against Natural 
Law, but designed within Natural Law itself as an attempt to clarify their meaning and 
adapt their theses to new contexts and concerns.  
 
When trying to understand contemporary Spanish Legal Philosophy, no diligent 
scholar should overlook the fact that two of our most international Legal Philosophers, Luis 
Legaz Lacambra and Luis Recaséns Siches shared two basic particularities: the influence of 
Ortega y Gasset’s ratio-vitalism in their formative years and their interest in legal 
experience showed in some of their latest most influential works. If Ruiz-Giménez 
proposed an approximation between institutionalism and ratio-vitalism, Legaz and 
Recaséns have the merit of having noticed the similarities between some ratio-vitalist 
premises and the philosophy of legal experience.  
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Luis Legaz Lacambra (1906-1980) elaborated in his early years a concept of Law 
that shows the imprint of two opposing influences: Kelsenean formalism and Ortega’s 
ratio-vitalism. In his foreword to the second edition of his Filosofía del derecho 
(Philosophy of Law), published in 1961, Legaz asserts his aim of characterising his 
conception using a clearer notion of Natural Law than the one usually used, thus conceding 
Natural Law a central role in his legal theory. Natural Law would then be responsible for 
the concretization of the scope of a “point of view on justice” that constitutes the valorative 
dimension of Law. This dimension had a merely formal character in Legaz’s early years. 
Law –Legaz would point in his second stage– is always a “point of view on justice” and 
accordingly Natural Law must be the best possible point of view on justice –justice in its 
purest programmatic form (Legaz 1961). 
 
Luis Recaséns Siches (1903-1977) deems the axiological dimension of Law the 
object of Natural Law, which he referred to for a portion of his career as “estimativa 
jurídica” (legal estimative). Later on, he preferred to return to the traditional label to avoid 
the logomachy implied in using two names for the same object. For Recaséns, Natural Law 
is built upon ideal objective values from which necessarily valid guidelines are derived. 
These values belong to the human existence and, particularly, to specific situations 
experienced through life. Natural Law must not therefore be understood as an expression of 
facts, since in the realm of being there are good and bad phenomena, fair and unfair, 
convenient and inconvenient facts, virtues and vices, health and illness. Natural Law must 
be understood as a set of normative principles and not descriptions of ontological realities: 
it does not express a being, but an “ought-to-be” conceived as an identification of what the 
author calls estimative criteria (Recaséns 1961; 1983). 
 
One of the most solid and stimulating innovative attempts within contemporary 
Spanish Natural Law may be found in the works of Professor Antonio Truyol y Serra 
(1913-2003), who elaborated a systematic and historical summary of Natural Law thinking 
during the 50s. There, he proposed an interrelation between law and morals, conceived as 
different normative realms. This conceptual distinction does not entail the sort of separation 
alleged by Legal Positivism. The intertwining of both orders reaches its most important 
expression, according to Truyol, in social morality, that is, that part of morality that 
determines one’s duties as a member of society (Truyol 1950). 
 
An innovative character may also be appreciated in the thought and works of 
Joaquín Ruiz Giménez, who held the Legal Philosophy Chair at the Complutense 
University of Madrid. His doctoral dissertation, published later, became a pioneering 
research within Spanish Legal Institutionalism. An effort to renovate Natural Law may also 
be noticed in the theses of Professor Mariano Hurtado and Professor José Mª Rodríguez 
Paniagua. The latter is responsible for a suggestive Natural Law conception based upon 
Legal Axiology. It is widely recognized that Professor José Delgado occupies a leading role 
in the critical review of Natural Law topics. There are three basic aspects that articulate his 
innovative attitude. Firstly, his prospective reading of the Salamanca School; secondly, his 
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interest in facing one the greatest challenges that contemporary culture poses before 
classical Natural Law: the problem of historicity in legal categories; and finally, his aim of 
overcoming the secular tension between Natural Law and Legal Positivism. That is why he 
interprets some of the most solid legal-philosophical constructions of our time (Hart, Rawls, 
Dworkin, Alexy…) as theoretical attempts aiming at showing the crisis experienced by 
Legal Positivism, but without formally taking sides with traditional Natural Law. An 
undeniable innovative character prompts the conception of Natural Law proposed by José 
Luis López Aranguren, who accepted Natural Law as bearing a legal pretension and 
keeping Law open to historical, cultural, political and social realities. Much influenced by 
Aranguren’s theses as well as the teachings of Ruiz-Giménez and Peces-Barba is the 
intellectual career of Professor Eusebio Fernández, who opts for a critical and deontological 
Natural Law, understood as a compound of exigencies of public morality that must inspire 
and limit positive Law (Pérez Luño 2007). 
 
Jesús Ballesteros is considered José Corts Grau’s main disciple. He wrote a very 
meticulous PhD dissertation that was later edited a book in 1973 under the title La filosofía 
jurídica de Giuseppe Capograssi (Legal Philosophy in Giuseppe Capograssi). This work 
highly contributed to raise an interest in Spain for the most important representative of the 
Italian Legal Experience conception, Giuseppe Capograssi. Ballesteros offers a Natural 
Law interpretation of Legal Experience according to which legal knowledge is not 
understood as a sheer external projection of certain logical methods, because knowledge 
cannot be separated from human action –Law is considered as a product of life experience, 
life itself being regarded as an ethical experience (Ballesteros 1973; 1984). 
 
Spanish Natural Law tradition has drawn on a wide number of scholars especially 
committed to providing an historical approach to Natural Law. This tradition has weakened 
lately, but it still produces some relevant contributions. Among those who develop their 
historiographical reflections within Legal Experience, Professor Francisco Contreras Peláez 
stands out thanks to his valuable contributions analysing Kant and Savigny from a Natural 
Law and Legal Philosophy perspective (Contreras 2005). In a similar fashion, Fernando 
Llano Alonso is responsible for a relevant work on Immanuel Kant’s cosmopolitan 
Humanism (Llano 2002). Carlos López Bravo undertakes a firm historiographical vocation 
aimed at studying the sources of Natural Law, particularly, drawing upon a suggestive 
critical review of Paul of Tarsus and Isidore of Seville. Nevertheless, his main contribution 
to Natural Law historiography lays in his monograph on Philosophy of History and 
Philosophy and Natural Law in Giambatista Vico (López Bravo 2003). 
 
Reference needs also to be made to my own intellectual experience, which has 
involved a long-term engagement with these innovations in Natural Law. Having studied 
the scholars pertaining to the Salamanca School through the teachings of my uncle 
Professor Enrique Luño Peña, I never abandoned my interest towards their doctrinal legacy. 
I have, consequently, had the chance to produce different papers as well as a 
comprehensive general book in which, celebrating the fifth centenary of the discovery of 
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the New World, I tried to renovate the spanische Naturrechtslehre Forschung in a threefold 
fashion: addressing those thinkers or topics that had been neglected or insufficiently 
studied; performing a “meta-theoretical sieve” on those doctrinal studies so far developed 
in order to test their critical liability; proposing prospective analyses to explore the 
contemporary projections of this theoretical legacy (Pérez Luño 1994). The teachings and 
stimuli received from other Legal philosophers had a similar importance in my attempts to 
renovate Natural Law. My PhD dissertation, written in University of Bologna under the 
direction of Guido Fassò, was defended in 1969. It analysed the tensions between Natural 
Law theories and Legal Positivism in contemporary Italy. Its Spanish version was 
published two years later, counting with a foreword by Professor Fassò himself (Pérez 
Luño 1971). I then transferred to University of Freiburg where I had the chance to receive 
the teachings of Professor Eric Wolf. In the following years, my contact and scientific 
relations with different Spanish and foreign colleagues allowed me to settle my ideas and 
innovative intentions regarding Natural Law. Bearing such an aim in mind, I have always 
found it appropriate to distinguish between an ontological, dogmatic or radical Natural 
Law, which defends a metaphysically objectivistic order from which absolute and 
extemporal values may be deduced; and a deontological, critical or moderate Natural Law, 
which does not deny legal character to unfair Positive Law, but establishes certain criteria 
in order to assess such a regulation and therefore set grounds for its criticism and 
substitution by a just system. Regarding the first version, I deem it incompatible with 
important values and exigencies of our contemporary humanist culture, so I consequently 
endorse a rationalist, deontological and critical Natural Law. Some have argued that it is 
possible to admit the existence of values prior to Positive Law with no alignment with 
Natural Law whatsoever as long as they are kept in a moral or social, but not legal, realm. I 
cannot share this position, because it seems quite paradoxical that legal scholars from both 
past and present times would sustain that the criteria used to identify proper or correct Law 
are not legal. This attitude finds no match within epistemology, where no one argues the 
logical character of the criteria that enable one to tell truth from falsity; just as no one 
questions the aesthetical character of the criteria that tell beauty from ugliness and there is 
no controversy on the moral nature of the postulates that tell good from evil (Pérez Luño 
2006). 
 
IV. NATURAL LAW IN PRIVATE LAW 
 
The spread of Natural Law during Franco’s regime did not limit to the legal-
philosophical sphere. It also reached some other relevant areas of the legal life and, 
especially, the methodological attitudes of scholars specialising in Private Law. The 
methodological incidence of Natural Law expressed itself as an attempt to overcome 
formalism and therefore ground the interpretation and application of Law upon valorative 
premises that, in that time, would be specified according to Neo-Scholastic ethical 
postulates. For Spanish Private Law scholars of that time, the methodological approach to 
Law would usually be carried off according to Christian Natural Law. This fact responded 
to the belief, exposed by Civil Law scholar Antonio Hernández Gil (1915-1994), that the 
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highest and most genuine Spanish Legal Theory could not be but Natural Law. This 
tendency was the most popular one among those of our legal scholars that approached the 
basic concepts and concerns of legal theory and methodology in that historical-cultural 
context.  
 
According to Hernández Gil, this theoretical option enabled the avoidance of risky 
openly anti-philosophical tendencies embraced by legal scholars in other countries, 
allowing this way an overcoming of a pretended antagonism between philosophical and 
legal methodologies from a Natural Law perspective (Hernández Gil 1945).  
 
This spirit also inspired Private Law scholar Felipe-Clemente de Diego (1886-
1945), who considered that method meant order as long as it served diverse human ends, 
came from human nature itself and found a fundamental explanation in the science of the 
ultimate causes and reasons, that is, in philosophy. That is why this task cannot be merely 
mechanical, as Legal Positivism pretends, but it requires a valorative position that stays 
openly in tension with the needs of legal praxis, an attitude that only a Natural Law 
methodology may propitiate. For Federico de Castro (1903-1983), positive Law always 
requires a justification. This comes expressed in a chart of immutable values that legitimize 
legal instances that respect them while reducing to sheer un-legal arbitrariness those pieces 
of legal production that contradicts them. Natural Law offers criteria to judge Positive Law, 
but since human weakness and the indifferent character of certain acts render it impossible 
to apply in the world or the State a regulation totally coinciding with Natural Law, their 
relationship needs to be determined. Following Thomas Aquinas, De Castro points that 
human law may be derived from Natural Law, either per modum conclusionis, establishing 
consequences and particular applications of a general principle of Natural Law, or per 
modum determinationis, concretising what has to be done within the scope offered by the 
Natural Law. Positive Law thus acts based upon the generality or indeterminacy found in 
Natural Law. Civil Law Professor and President of the Supreme Court José Castán Tobeñas 
(1889-1969), considered it urgent in our post-civil war scenario to follow both Spanish and 
universal, classical and modern Natural Law. He pointed out in his works that the 
requirements of Natural Law came from the practical needs of interpreting and elaborating 
our positive law, always created with an ethical perspective, as well as from the theoretical 
advantages that classical Natural Law provides as a fundamentally homogenous doctrine 
within the history of Western thought, accessible by all and scientifically and popularly 
grounded at the same time. This characterisation contrasts with the compound of modern 
philosophical theories that continuously are born and die without effectively penetrating in 
the soul of society or acquiring a sound comprehension by legal scholars themselves (Legaz 
1975; Pérez Luño  2007).  
 
The influence of Neo-Scholastic Natural Law on the Spanish legal scene during 
Franco’s regime was not bounded to the scholarly sphere, but it also had an impact on case-
law. Most of the solemn invocations to Natural Law produced by the courts were but sheer 
declarations of principles, though. If we take a superficial look at the decisions taken by our 
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Supreme Court during Franco’s regime, in cases related to values and principles of justice 
and morality, we may think that judges did really try hard to stay away from the political 
bindings of that time. There is, actually, an argumentation trend found in case-law that 
insists on the supra-historical and meta-temporary character of their moral assessments 
(Pérez Luño 1990; Pérez Ruiz 1987).   
 
V. NATURAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Legal thinking cannot exist or be intelligible if it is regarded aside from the political, 
cultural and social circumstances that delimit its spatial-temporal context. Theories and 
works belonging to one determinate historical stage of Natural Law cannot be 
comprehended regardless of a determinate system of collective experiences. One cannot 
understand the peculiarities of the topics and perspectives that characterise Spanish Natural 
Law in the last years without an account of the new circumstances that contextualise its 
development. The political changes taken place in our country by the end of the 70s meant 
a substitution of an authoritarian regime by a democratic State fully respectful of the rule of 
law. This fact has directly and decisively influenced the research and activities undertaken 
by current Legal Philosophers. In my opinion the most important event having a decisive 
impact on Spanish Natural Law has been the enactment of the 1978 Constitution. The civic 
and intellectual mobilisation that the Spanish Constitution brought about also implied a 
commitment, a challenge and a renovated scientific enterprise. The Constitution has 
represented for many legal philosophers and theoreticians of my generation a true milestone 
that has shaken both our condition of citizens and our intellectual career. The enactment of 
the Constitution meant the beginning of a still on-going research venture for the Spanish 
legal culture.  
 
The leading role played by fundamental rights in the 1978 Constitution has made 
them a crucial aspect of our legal culture. In fact, fundamental rights are assigned the task 
of guiding the performance of public powers and articulating the implementation of the 
active subjective status of citizens. According to certain viewpoints assumed by a version 
of critical Natural Law version that lays close to the ideas of the Frankfurt School, the 
rights and liberties granted in our current Constitution have been considered as 
institutionalised vindictive channels for the great aspirations and needs of the Spanish 
society and, in fact, it cannot be denied that that this has actually been the case. From other 
perspectives, linked to the liberal Natural Law tradition, the meaning of these rights and 
liberties have been specified as an explicitation of the superior values that ground our 
Rechtsstaat (art. 1.1 Spanish Constitution). There is no doubt that fundamental rights 
contain an undeniable axiological character and that they evoke this condition with their 
very name as it may clearly be noticed in the Spanish Constitution wording, where “los 
derechos fundamentales” (…) “son fundamento del orden político y la paz social” 
(“fundamental rights” (….) “are the foundation of political order and social peace”) (art. 
10.1 Spanish Constitution). Other theses, inspired by versions of Natural Law versions that 
show a more sensitive attitude to History, have insisted on the idea that liberties have a 
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“proteic” character and they necessarily adequate to the cultural, social and economic 
mutations that have prompted recent Spanish politics.   
 
Some Legal Philosophers, like Javier Antuátegui, Rafael de Asís, Gregorio Peces-
Barba, Luis Prieto Sanchís, Gregorio Robles, among others, have attempted a positivist 
grounding of what the revolutionary French agreed to call “droits de l’homme”. Yet, a 
grounding based upon Natural Law allows a better explanation of the legal vocation of 
these rights. This may be shown by drawing on Romanic languages, where the same root 
explains the words Law (derecho, diritto, direito, droit) and rights (derechos, diritti, 
direitos, droits), alluding to a both normative (legal) and moral (right) reality. Thus, it is 
much harder and less convincing to explain the scope of the term “derechos” (rights) in the 
expression “derechos humanos” (human rights) from positivist premises than from a 
Natural Law background. This is due to the fact that Positivism is a monist theory and 
therefore it only attributes legal character to positive Law. From this perspective, talking 
about any natural, human, moral or pre-normative right, as something different from 
positive law constitutes a contradictio in terminis. Natural Law theory, as a dualist legal 
theory, distinguishes two different normative systems: a Natural Law conformed by a 
compound of values prior to positive law that must ground, guide and critically limit every 
legal regulation; and positive law, established or imposed by the binding force of those 
holding the power in society. They are “rights” with a diverse deontic status but with no 
independence, because every natural right tends to be positivised and every positive right, 
as long as it pretends to be fair, must follow Natural Law. Natural Law has had the 
persistent historical function of establishing limits to power. Pervading the civic conscience 
with the idea that there are values inherent to the human being that no political authority 
may breach, modern Natural Lawyers offered an explanation of the very rationale of rights 
that cannot be discarded without weakening the grounding of human rights at the same 
time. The historical attempts to offer a positivist alternative to the Natural Law conception 
of human rights inevitably lead to compromising their political efficacy. Suffice it to think 
about the relevance acquired in the 19th century by the category of subjective public rights, 
coined by the German Public Law School as an effort of substituting the idea of natural 
rights as liberties enjoyed by citizens before their government through the introduction of 
some subjective status that depend upon the government’s self-limitation. We should recall, 
following Antonio Truyol y Serra, that this fashion of understanding rights was connected 
to the idea of denouncing the legal character of an International Law exclusively built upon 
the “will of the States” and conceived more as a set of moral or courtesy rules followed by 
nations (comitas gentium) than as true Law (Truyol 1968; Ballesteros 1992; De Castro Cid 
1982; Fernández 1984; Pérez Luño 2005; Vidal 2002). 
 
The Natural Law grounding of human rights has also manifested itself regarding 
current important concerns such as the legal impact of new technologies, quality of life and 
environmental issues or the risks that biotechnology poses to citizen’s rights.  
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The study of the legal projections of New Technologies (NT) has raised a growing 
interest among our legal philosophers and theoreticians. This topic that, paraphrasing 
Ortega, could be labelled as the “theme of our time” could not help but to draw the 
attention of Natural Lawyers just as it has involved the main legal research areas in 
developed countries. In the last decades, the conceptual and textual universe of legal 
scholars has seen a profound and radical change due to the transformation of the cultural, 
political and economic premises experienced in contemporary technological societies. The 
phenomenon called "liberties’ pollution" in English-speaking countries deserves special 
attention. It refers to the new forms of breach that rights and liberties might suffer through 
the abusive use of informatics and, particularly, Internet (Garriga 1999; González-Tablas; 
Pérez Luño 1976; 2004). 
 
The present of human rights demands an adequate sensitivity towards the 
“ecological paradigm” from jurists and legal philosophers and theoreticians inserted in the 
Natural Law tradition. This requires a critical reflexive attitude that entails an assumption 
of the responsibilities derived from the new challenges and issues that environmental 
threats pose in the economic, social, political and legal spheres. Striving to improve quality 
of life and to guarantee a balanced and sustainable development along with biodiversity 
stands as an unavoidable task for both legal practitioners and theoreticians (Ballesteros 
1995; Bellver 1994). 
 
Natural Law has also shown a topical and relevant interest in the consequences that 
Biomedicine, Bioethics and Biotechnology have on human rights. It is a research area 
closely related to the socio-legal repercussions of New Technologies, quality of life 
standing as peculiar element that counts with its own significance. Hence the 
interdisciplinarity of this field. Human dignity, identity and privacy are values and rights 
that, from a Natural Law perspective, must be protected before certain biotechnological 
investigations. The notion of “human nature”, a core aspect within the Natural Law 
tradition, gains new topicality and urgency concerning present bioethical issues (Cf. 
Ballesteros 2007; Marcos del Cano 2004). 
 
VI. NATURAL LAW THEORIES IN 20TH-CENTURY PORTUGAL 
 
The beginning of the 20th century meant a continuation and strengthening of the 
positivist trend within the Portuguese legal culture that had already been manifested in the 
last part of the 19th century, as we had the chance to mention earlier. The diffusion of a 
positivist and scientificist mentality contributed to lead Natural Law to a crisis and the 
study of this discipline became relegated to Seminaries and Theology Faculties. Among the 
most relevant circumstances that explain this situation we may refer the following ones: 
 
1) The creation of the Law Faculty of Lisbon in 1913. This academic centre 
appeared from its origins as a lay and republican alternative before the conservative and 
traditional old Coimbra Faculty of Law. The new Lisbon Faculty had no place to keep the 
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Natural Law tradition, which was considered a reminiscence of the past incompatible with 
the open and progressive mentality that was expected to guide the education of jurists. The 
innovative character of this new Faculty soon also helped to stimulate the renovation of the 
old Coimbra Faculty of Law, whose lecturers were unwilling to stay away from the 
requirements of modernisation.  
 
2) The diffusion of a legal methodology based upon the commentary and 
elaboration of legal rules in the Lisbon Faculty of Law and, slightly later, in Coimbra. The 
main feature of this methodology was the assumption of the exegetical French method. 
Some other versions of Legal Positivism, such as German Legal Dogmatics and General 
Legal Theory or British Analytical Jurisprudence, had a much lower impact. Some scholars 
showed an interest in utilitarianism, as well as in some evolutionist versions of positivism. 
All this determined a progressive abandonment of methods linked to Neo-Scholastic or 
Idealist-Krausist Natural Law theories that had reached a wide popularity by the beginning 
of the 19th century.   
 
3) The adherence of some lecturers, researchers and students from the Coimbra and 
Lisbon Law Faculties to progressive, reformist or even revolutionary political ideologies. In 
the first years of the 20th century some lecturers pertaining to these two Portuguese Law 
Faculties were inspired by different forms of the so-called “Chair Socialism”, as well as 
Marxism and Anarchism in their approaches to the concept, meaning and social function of 
Law (Cabral de Moncada 1960; Lacasta 1988; Merêa 1955). 
 
A clear theoretical example of the attitudes of legal scholars opposing Natural Law 
is found in the first works of Public Law Professor Domingos Fézàs Vital (1888-1953). 
Much influenced by the legal sociologism of French Legal theoretician Leon Duguit, Fézàs 
Vital rejected the notion of subjective right. He considered this concept to be a continuation 
of the sort of metaphysical ideas defended within Natural Law, since it assumes the 
existence of legal faculties belonging to people even before the recognition by positive 
rules emanating from the State. His later positions are representative of the turning point 
that determines the crisis of Positivism and the beginning of what has been called “the 
eternal return of Natural Law” (Rommen 1947). Certainly, in the mid-1920s professor Vital 
abandons his positivism and legal sociologism to join Legal Institutionalism under the 
influence of Maurice Hauriou and Georges Renard, whose doctrines he helped to spread in 
Portugal. From that point on, he attempted to elaborate a Neo-Thomist Institutional theory 
that would set the grounding of legal institutions in Christian Natural Law. This attitude 
would make him one of the ideologues of the New State, personified by Antonio Oliveira 
Salazar’s political authoritarianism and he would even become one of the inspirers of the 
1933 Portuguese Constitution, key legal text within that legal-political system (Fézàs Vital 
1929). 
 
The restored Portuguese interest in Natural Law had Professor and Dean of the 
Coimbra Law Faculty Luis Cabral de Moncada (1888-1974) as its most representative 
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figure. He may be considered as the most prestigious 20th century Legal Philosopher in 
Portugal. From the end of the 1920s he committed to the criticism of positivism and its 
consequences on legal education. Accordingly, he promoted the inclusion of Philosophy of 
Law as a compulsory subject in the Law Faculties’ syllabus. This intellectual attitude, 
always favouring Natural Law, evolved from Neo-Scholastic premises towards approaches 
closer to Phenomenology, Neo-Kantianism and Existentialism. Being deeply 
knowledgeable in German legal doctrine, he was influenced by Radbruch’s and Stammler’s 
theses and he critically studied the thought of Kelsen. His reputation became internationally 
acknowledged thanks to a honoris causa doctorate conferred by the University of 
Heidelberg (Jayme 1993). His Natural Law conception, open to the influence of 
Existentialism, finds concretion in his characterisation of the main mid-20th-century 
European beliefs: 1) the notion that social and political life must be built from inside out, as 
a projection of a deeper dimension than individual life itself and as a type of existence 
centred around the religious idea of salvation; 2) the conviction that State and Law are not 
ends in themselves or sheer instruments to achieve economic goals, but “tasks” of the 
human vocation of culture and, therefore, means to spiritual ends; 3) the belief that in order 
to fulfil those ends, it is necessary to appeal to objective, superior and non-historical values 
so that a superior axiological cosmos, alien to whims and fantasies, is reached. According 
to Cabral de Moncada, the problem of Natural Law is no longer metaphysical, but an 
ontological and axiological issue. This is so because, within the phenomenology of 
conscience and historicity, the autonomous sphere of the spiritual being has revealed itself 
as a new Logos, which is dependent, intertwined and conditioned by other vital 
circumstances, but still counting on its own laws, sense and aims. It is current Natural 
Lawyers’ task to figure out the structure of those values that we call spiritual and identify 
the laws that are to be followed accordingly. Justice and the common good within human 
societies would deserve the highest position in the scheme. This Natural Law only requires 
a belief in the reality of the spirit, but does not need to depend upon any metaphysical or 
religious conception, although the in limine legitimacy of these conceptions is not 
altogether excluded. On the contrary, only these last versions comply fully with the aims of 
Natural Law, which does not only present a theoretical mental problem, but also a practical 
problem directed towards action. Intelligence is not required on its own, but is also 
demands the concurrence of human will. Man will never be a man if he is not able to find, 
in the depth of his convictions and beliefs, a perspective of the absolute, as a last resort 
where he may assert the final reason and sense of all his deeds and needs as an spiritual 
being in this world (Cabral de Moncada 1945; 1966). 
 
The teachings and works of Cabral de Moncada had a significant influence on the 
thought of the most remarkable Portuguese legal philosophers from the second half of the 
20th century: Castanheira Neves, De Brito and Machado. Joâo Baptista Machado (1917-
1991) lectured International Law and Legal Philosophy in the new Oporto Law Faculty. In 
his first academic years, Machado paid special attention to Hans Kelsen, some of whose 
works he had the chance to translate into Portuguese, thus contributing to the diffusion of 
his thought within the Portuguese legal culture. In his mature years he intended to 
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overcome two basic premises of Kelsen’s theory: normativist positivism within legal theory 
and axiological relativism within legal legitimacy. With such an aim, he elaborated a 
Natural Law theory that out forward the actualisation and revision of its traditional Neo-
Scholastic version. Existentialism, in which Cabral de Moncada’s influence may be 
noticed, Hermeneutics and justice, in which he shows his knowledge of contemporary 
thinkers like Habermas, Luhmann and Rawls, served as theoretical sources for his 
ambitious project to renovate Natural Law (Ferreira da Cunha 2006). Antonio Castanheira 
Neves, born in 1929, lectured Legal Philosophy in the University of Coimbra. He is also 
quite critical regarding Legal Positivism and Natural Law. His criticism of legal positivism 
articulates upon his opposition towards a legal reasoning based upon subsumptions and 
syllogisms. He also rejects the ideal and abstract character that pervades many Natural Law 
conceptions. Before these notions, he opposes a real, concrete and historical Law that finds 
concretion in empirical legal cases. The solution to such cases constitutes the content of 
Law in an on-going process. That is why courts’ sentences are but the determination of 
what must be considered as legally correct within every legal system (Castanheira Neves 
1993). Some analysts of the works of Castanheira Neves have detected some analogies with 
hermeneutical theories or even with Dworkin’s integration theory. In one of his last works, 
Castanheira Neves nuances the possible coincidence with those theses and makes clear that 
his position is quite different, since it implies a higher emphasis on the experiential 
dimension of Law and entails, all in all, a necessary connection between theoretical 
reflection and real praxis within the legal sphere (Castanheira Neves  2003). 
 
The 1974 Carnation Revolution, whose main legal and political result was the 1976 
Constitution, determined the substitution of an authoritarian regime by a democratic State 
in Portugal. This important political transformation had its cultural consequences which 
were also manifested in the attitudes before Natural Law. So, within legal historiography, 
professor Antonio Hespanha, from the University of Lisbon, substituted traditional Natural 
Law, that had served as theoretical grounding for the conception of legal history of Paulo 
Merêa (1889-1976), by the philosophical premises of postmodern culture (Hespanha). 
Likewise, Coimbra professor José Gomes Canotilho replaced conservative Natural Law, 
predominant during the political rule of Antonio Oliveira Salazar and Marcelo Caetano, 
with critical legal conceptions clearly aligned with a progressive approach (Gomes 
Canotilho). Professor José Manuel Pureza, also pertaining to the University of Coimbra, 
has shown a deliberate intellectual purpose to revise cosmopolitan Natural Law as a 
grounding of International Law with an exigency of opening up to pluralism and 
multiculturalism. That way, Pureza tries to avoid an ideal and abstract universalism that 
might be mixed up with the standardisation of international legal principles and values 
(Pureza). Thanks to his research in Latin America, sociologist and legal theoretician 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos (Coimbra University) deserves special attention. De Sousa 
Santos opposes to the modernity paradigm –represented in the legal realm by the Natural 
Law cultivated in the Enlightenment era– a postmodern paradigm understood as a new 
critical conception of experience and a reformulation of legal and political common sense 
comprehended in emancipatory terms. Against the rationalist Natural Law rationality, 
Antonio-Enrique Pérez Luño 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 1 (2013) 
20 
 
which he calls “indolent reason”, he sets a utopic rationality committed to liberation and 
emancipation. The conversion of law into a myth promoted by Natural Law in the 
Enlightenment era requires a demystification, since the legal system has been proved 
unable to adequately solve some of the most important social issues. A scientific response 
to this progressive legal discredit demands a series of institutional mechanisms, procedures 
and reforms that may render law more accessible and more useful for the highest possible 
number of citizens (De Sousa Santos 1995; 1998; 2003).  
 
VII. CONCLUSION: PREMISES FOR AN ASSESSMENT  
 
As a summarial assessment, it may be pointed that Natural Law theory stays 
currently at a crossroads in both Spain and Portugal. New influences, profound changes and 
worrying uncertainties seem to characterise this scene. In our legal culture, the last years 
have passed under a syndrome of exhaustion and crisis of the paradigms that have 
traditionally articulated Natural Law and Legal Positivism. Just like the famous 
Pirandello’s characters, many of the youngest Spanish and Portuguese legal philosophers 
and theoreticians are “in search of an author”. During the last years, the wish to overcome 
the doctrinal background inherited from the recent past has served as an incentive for the 
urgent adoption of the imported theoretical models that are deemed more appropriate 
according to the circumstances. The new versions of Legal Positivism, under the 
ambiguous label of “Post-Positivism”, different tendencies linked to Analytical philosophy, 
Neo-Constitutionalism, Multiculturalist topics, Feminism, Ecologism, criticism of global 
society… are some of the heterogeneous study programmes and/or theories which are 
object of scholarly attention. This renovating attitude is fully legitimate in terms of 
intellectual concern and anti-conformism and only the future will enable an adequate 
assessment of their results, since it is not possible to draw definitive conclusions from a 
panorama that still stays in fieri, to use a legal aphorism.  
 
As a synthetic reflection, I understand that the biggest danger currently underlying 
the most innovative movements within Iberian legal theory and philosophy would be their 
eagerness to make a clean sweep of the past Natural law era, thus indiscriminatingly 
condemning tendencies that due to their secular history and plurality of meanings present a 
compound of implications and nuances that are hardly integrated in a simplifying criticism. 
Natural Law has enabled an engaged attitude thanks to the penetration of moral values into 
Law throughout different times and legal cultures. This aspect of the historical function of 
Natural Law urgently needs to be clarified and taken into account. Otherwise, Spain and 
Portugal would paradoxically experience the rise and strengthening of attitudes opposed to 
Natural Law that at the same time appeal to rationally-grounded objective (even though in a 
historical-sociological sense) values and defend the need to recognise basic human rights 
and values as legitimising ends or guidelines for every legal system, thus claiming a 
connection between law and morals. These positions, therefore, implicitly admit well-
known Natural Law premises. The opening up to human values and rights, as well as to a 
historical conscience, typical of the renovating Natural Law theses; the will of some critical 
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legal theories to rescue to most vivid aspects of humanist Natural Law defending the notion 
of human dignity (Ernst Bloch 1961); and the tendencies that try to rehabilitate practical 
reason as well as those that attempt to address the problems of our contemporary globalised 
and technological society from a renovated theory of justice, they all show the persistence 
of the big questions linked to the historical development of Natural Law doctrines. 
Because, in any case, as Karl Jaspers indicated in his 1949 Vom Ursprung und Ziel der 
Geschichte, the general image of history and the conscience of the present situation are 
both mutually interdependent: the more profound the conscience of the past, the more 
authentic the participation in the present moment.   
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